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(Ecofin Agency) – Given the growing insecurity and increasing socio-economic challenges, the International Crisis Group recommends that Mali’s authorities adjust their sovereignist approach, focusing on reallocating public spending towards social sectors and easing tensions with financial partners.
A report released on December 3 by the American think tank International Crisis Group (ICG) discusses the sovereignist turn taken by Mali’s transitional authorities since they came to power in May 2021, following a double coup. The report highlights the serious limits of this approach, which has led to the country losing support from international and regional partners. This shift has left Mali without sustainable solutions to its security problems and has reduced financial resources to meet the population’s needs.
Titled A Course Correction for Mali’s Sovereign Turn, the report points out that the military leaders, who replaced the first transitional president, Bah N’Daw, after his own ousting, have made sovereignty the core of their political agenda. Combining nationalism with references to Pan-Africanism, this new approach aims to restore the country’s autonomy, which the current leaders believe was undermined by a decade of foreign interference.
Supporters of this shift argue that it represents a double break: first, by reducing the influence of Western partners, particularly France, the former colonial power, and multilateral organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations, seen as tools of external interference. The second break is with a democratic political model established since the 1990s. Former leaders and political parties are accused of monopolizing power and undermining democracy, especially in recent years by ceding control over the country’s policies, including critical areas like security and education, to external partners.
This sovereignist turn has allowed the military to govern without elections. However, it is not just a rhetorical tool to justify military rule; it has deeply influenced government policies in security, diplomacy, and economics.
Ongoing Security Challenges
The authorities have focused on security matters, dismantling international frameworks put in place by France and forging new alliances, including with Russia. In November 2023, one of the most tangible results of this shift was the recapture of Kidal, a stronghold of separatist armed groups.
Diplomatically, Mali has distanced itself from many Western and regional partners, including France, and has announced, along with Niger and Burkina Faso, its withdrawal from ECOWAS. Economically, the government has reduced reliance on Western aid. For example, in 2023, the government rejected a budget allocation of €50 million from the European Union, arguing that it did not align with the priorities set by President Assimi Goïta (pictured), particularly regarding the state’s ability to determine how aid should be used.
These political, economic, and diplomatic breaks reflect the population’s strong desire for change and have fueled high hopes for the current leadership. On social media, many Malians have expressed pride in their country, in seeing the military redeploy its forces, and in having leaders who dare to break away from “neo-colonial forces.”
However, the report stresses that this sovereignist shift, while popular among many Malians, carries significant risks. In security terms, the efforts supported by Russia have not ended the conflict. They have even reignited clashes with separatist groups that signed the 2015 peace agreement. Diplomatic rifts with many partners and closer ties with Russia could lead Mali into another form of dependency, potentially isolating the country further.
Economically, the sharp drop in Western aid has forced the government to focus its resources on operating expenses, like salaries, at the expense of investments that drive the economy and improve public services. In 2017, operating and investment expenses made up about 55% and 45% of the budget, respectively. By 2023, these figures shifted to 79% and 21%.
Three Key Corrective Measures
Reducing aid and international financing has also made it harder for the country to import fuel and maintain its power plants, leading to disruptions in energy supply. Tensions with Côte d’Ivoire, a major regional electricity supplier, have worsened the situation.
Furthermore, the authorities are investing more heavily in defense and internal security than in social sectors like education and health. Between 2020 and 2024, the budget for the Ministry of Internal Security grew by over 80%, while the Ministry of Health’s budget increased by only 8%.
In this context, public support for the transitional authorities could fade as quickly as it appeared if the government fails to restore peace or provide basic services to the population. The regime could find itself in a security and socio-economic deadlock, leading to an authoritarian spiral.
To avoid these risks, the authorities should adjust the sovereignist approach by taking three key corrective actions. First, they should rebalance public spending to prioritize essential social sectors, such as health and education. To fund these services, the Malian government will need to make compromises and re-engage with key financial partners, including former Western allies, who can help finance major investments. In this context, Bamako should also ease tensions with neighboring countries, particularly Côte d’Ivoire and Algeria.
The Malian government should work to curb hate speech against its opponents and promote greater social cohesion through dialogue, including with representatives of armed groups.
International and regional partners also have a role to play in helping adjust Mali’s trajectory. Instead of rejecting the sovereignist turn, they should seek areas of potential cooperation. To avoid a situation similar to that of France, Russia could encourage the Malian authorities to explore non-military solutions to the security crisis.
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